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Evaluation	of	Circuit	Judge	Kavanaugh’s	Opinions	Concerning	the	CAA.	
	
Arnold	W.	Reitze,	Jr.		
S.J.	Quinney	College	of	Law	
The	University	of	Utah	
arnold.reitze@law.utah.edu	
August	4,	2018	
	 Nineteen	opinions	by	Circuit	 Judge	Kavanaugh	 in	 the	D.C.	 Circuit	 dealing	with	 the	Clean	Air	Act	(CAA)	were	reviewed.	In	eleven	of	the	cases,	Circuit	Judge	Kavanaugh	wrote	the	 majority	 opinion.	 	 In	 two	 cases	 he	 wrote	 a	 concurring	 opinion	 and	 in	 six	 cases	 he	dissented.	The	 cases	where	Circuit	 Judge	Kavanaugh	wrote	 the	majority	 opinion	 are:	 (1)	
Americans	 for	Clean	Energy	 v.	EPA,	 864	F.3d	691	 (2017);	 (2)	Mexichem	Fluor,	 Inc.	 v.	EPA,	866	 F.3d	 451(2017);	 (3)	 Energy	 Future	 Coalition	 v.	 EPA,	 793	 F.3d	 141	 (2015);	 (4)	 EME	
Homer	City	Generation,	L.P.	v.	EPA,	795	F.3d	118	(2015);	(5)	In	re	Murray	Energy	v.	EPA,	788	F.3d	330	(2015);	(6)	National	Ass’n	of	Manufacturers	v.	EPA,	750	F.3d	921	(2014);	(7)	NRDC	
v.	EPA,	749	F.3d	1055	 (2014);	 (8)	American	Road	&	Transportation	Builders	Ass’n	 v.	EPA,	705	F.3d	453	 (2013);	 (9)	Honeywell	 International,	 Inc.	 v.	EPA,	 705	F.3d	470	 (2013);	 (10)	
EME	Homer	City	Generation,	L.P.	v.	EPA,	696	F.3d	7	(2012,	rehearing	en	banc	denied	Jan.	24,	2013);	and	(11)	American	Trucking	Ass’ns,	Inc.	v.	EPA,	600	F.3d	624	(2010).			Circuit	 Judge	 Kavanaugh’s	 concurring	 opinions	 are	 found	 in;	 (1)	 Utility	 Air	
Regulatory	Group	v.	EPA,	744	F.3d	741	(2014);	and	(2)	Center	for	Biological	Diversity	v.	EPA,	722	F.3d	401	(2013).	His	dissents	are	found	at:	(1)	Mexichem	Specialty	Resins,	 Inc.	v.	EPA,	787	F.3d	544	(2015);	(2)	(2)	White	Stallion	Energy	Center,	LLC	v.	EPA,	748	F.3d	1222	(D.C.	Cir.	2014);	 (3)Texas	v.	EPA,	726	F.3d	180	(2013);	 (4)	Grocery	Mfrs.	Ass’n	v.	EPA,	693	F.3d	169	(2012);	(5)	Sierra	Club	v.	EPA,	536	F.3d	673	(2008),	and	(6)	Coalition	for	Responsible	
Regulation	v.	EPA,	2012	WL	6621785	(Dec.	20,	2012).		
Discussion		Circuit	Judge	Kavanaugh’s	opinions	in	these	air	pollution	cases	demonstrate	an	impressive	knowledge	 of	 the	 Clean	 Air	 Act	 (CAA).	 His	 opinions	 are	 thoroughly	 researched;	 his	arguments	are	well	organized;	and	his	writing	quality	 is	excellent.	When	deciding	a	case,	Judge	 Kavanaugh’s	 loadstone	 is	 the	 doctrine	 of	 separation	 of	 powers	 as	 embodied	 in	articles	1,2,	and	3	of	 the	U.S.	Constitution.	 	This	 is	 combined	with	his	 focus	on	 the	 literal	language	 of	 the	 statute.	 He	 believes	 a	 court’s	 assessment	 of	 an	 agency’s	 compliance	 with	
statutory	 limits	 does	 not	 depend	 on	 whether	 the	 agency’s	 policy	 is	 good	 or	 whether	 the	
agency’s	 intentions	 are	 laudatory.	 Even	when	 that	 is	 true,	 the	 courts	must	 enforce	 statutory	
limits.	His	view	is	that	a	court’s	job,	is	not	to	make	the	policy	choices,	but	it	is	to	carefully	but	
firmly	enforce	the	statutory	boundaries.	
 In	a	controversy	involving	the	protection	of	the	environment	versus	the	protection	of	the	powers	of	Congress,	his	priority	is	protecting	the	legislative	branch	from	efforts	by	EPA	to	expand	its	authority	through	its	interpretation	of	the	CAA.	In	the	eleven	CAA	cases	
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in	 which	 Circuit	 Judge	 Kavanaugh	 wrote	 the	 majority	 opinion,	 ten	 involved	 industry	petitioners.	In	six	of	the	cases	the	petition	was	denied;	in	four	the	court	remanded	the	case	back	to	EPA.	His	remands	are	often	based	on	his	view	that	EPA	regulations	or	other	actions	exceed	the	Agency’s	statutory	powers.		Judge	 Kavanaugh’s	 record	 is	 impressive.	 His	 professional	 activities	 are	 an	 open	book.	But	 the	decision	 to	 support	his	nomination	will	 not	be	based	on	his	qualifications.	Chief	 Circuit	 Court	 Judge	 Merrick	 Garland	 had	 outstanding	 qualifications	 when	 he	 was	nominated	but	no	proceeding	were	ever	held	by	the	Senate.	A	decision	to	approve	him	for	a	position	 on	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 will	 be	 based	 on	 whether	 a	 majority	 of	 the	 Senate	 will	support	his	conservative	views.	 In	terms	of	the	impact	on	air	pollution	control,	he	can	be	expected	 to	 support	 a	 stronger	 Congress	 and	 a	weaker	 EPA,	which	 is	 likely	 to	 lead	 to	 a	relaxation	of	air	pollution	control	regulation.			
Case	summaries		Brief	summaries	of	the	nineteen	cases	follow.	Because	many	cases	involve	multiple	claims	for	relief	only	the	most	important	issues	that	shape	the	final	result	are	discussed.		
Majority	opinions		
Americans	for	Clean	Energy	v.	EPA,	864	F.3d	691	(2017)	Various	 organizations,	 companies,	 and	 interest	 groups	 petitioned	 for	 review	 of	 the	Environmental	 Protection	 Agency’s	 (EPA)	 final	 rule	 setting	 renewable	 fuel	 requirements	for	 transportation	 fuel.	 Circuit	 Judge	 Kavanaugh	 held:	 EPA’s	 interpretation	 of	 the	“inadequate	domestic	supply”	waiver	provision	for	the	CAA’s	renewable	fuel	program	was	inconsistent	with	the	CAA.	The	petition	was	granted	in	part,	denied	in	part,	vacated	in	part,	and	remanded	in	part.	
 
Mexichem	Fluor,	Inc.	v.	EPA,	866	F.3d	451(2017)	Manufacturers	of	hydrofluorocarbons	(HFCs)	petitioned	 for	a	review	of	EPA’s	decision	 to	remove	HFCs	from	list	of	substitutes	for	ozone-depleting	substances	and	place	it	on	list	of	prohibited	ozone-depleting	substances.	The	primary	issue	was	whether	EPA	had	statutory	authority	to	issue	the	2015	Rule	regulating	HFCs.	EPA	issued	the	rule	based	on	CAA	§	612,	which	 requires	 the	 replacement	 of	 ozone-depleting	 substances	 with	 safe	 substitutes.	However,	HFCs	are	not	ozone-depleting	substances.	Therefore,	the	court	vacated	rule	2015	and	remanded	the	case	to	EPA.		
Energy	Future	Coalition	v.	EPA,	793	F.3d	141	(2015)	EPA	adopted	regulations	that	require	vehicle	manufacturers	to	test	the	emissions	from	new	vehicles	using	a	“test	fuel	that	is	“commercially	available.”	Petitioners	want	EPA	to	approve	E30,	which	is	a	fuel	that	contains	about	30%	ethanol,	for	use	as	a	test	fuel.	But	E30	is	not	yet	 “commercially	available,”	 as	 required	by	EPA’s	 test	 fuel	 regulation.	Biofuel	producers	petitioned	for	review	of	 final	action	of	EPA,	arguing	that	 the	Agency’s	 test	 fuel	regulation	was	arbitrary	and	capricious.	The	court	held	EPA’s	regulation	was	reasonable	and	rooted	in	the	CAA,	and	thus	not	arbitrary	and	capricious.	The	petition	was	denied.	
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EME	Homer	City	Generation,	L.P.	v.	EPA,	795	F.3d	118	(2015)	A	group	of	state	and	local	governments,	joined	by	industry	and	labor	groups,	petitioned	for	review	 of	 EPA’s	 Transport	 Rule,	 which	 called	 for	 cost-effective	 allocation	 of	 emission	reductions	 among	 upwind	 states	 in	 order	 to	 improve	 air	 quality	 in	 polluted	 downwind	areas.	This	provision	is	known	as	the	good	neighbor	provision.	The	D.C.	Circuit	vacated	the	rule.	 The	 Supreme	 Court,	 134	 S.Ct.1584,	 reversed	 and	 remanded	 the	 case.	 On	 remand,	Circuit	Judge	Kavanaugh,	held	that:	EPA’s	2014	sulfur	dioxide	(SO2)	emissions	budgets	for	Texas,	Alabama,	Georgia,	and	South	Carolina	that	required	those	States	to	reduce	emissions	were	invalid;	EPA’s	2014	ozone-season	NOx	emissions	budgets	that	related	to	1997	8–hour	ozone	 national	 ambient	 air	 quality	 standards	 (NAAQS)	 for	 upwind	 States	 that	 required	each	 of	 those	 States	 to	 reduce	 emissions	 were	 invalid	 The	 case	 was	 remanded	 without	vacatur.	
 
In	re	Murray	Energy	v.	EPA,	788	F.3d	330	(2015)	A	coal	company	and	states	petitioned	for	review	of	EPA’s	proposed	rule	restricting	carbon	dioxide	emissions	from	existing	power	plants.	Circuit	Judge	Kavanaugh,	held	that	proposed	rule	was	not	final	agency	action	subject	to	judicial	review.	The	petition	was	denied.		
National	Ass’n	of	Manufacturers	v.	EPA,	750	F.3d	921	(2014)	Manufacturers’	association	and	industry	groups	petitioned	for	review	of	the	EPA’s	lowering	of	the	National	Ambient	Air	Quality	Standard	(NAAQS)	for	fine	particulate	matter	from	15.0	μg/m	3	to	12.0	μg/m	3.			Circuit	 Judge	 Kavanaugh	 held	 that	 EPA’s	 decision	 to	 lower	 the	 NAAQS	 for	 particulate	matter	and	its	decision	to	eliminate	the	use	of	spatial	averaging	to	demonstrate	compliance	with	 the	 NAAQS	 was	 not	 unreasonable.	 In	 addition,	 EPA’s	 addition	 of	 a	 near-road	component	 to	 the	 monitoring	 network	 for	 demonstrating	 NAAQS	 compliance	 was	 not	unreasonable.			The	petition	was	denied.	
NRDC	v.	EPA,	749	F.3d	1055	(2014)	Environmental	 associations	 petitioned	 for	 review	 of	 final	 actions	 of	 EPA	 concerning	 its	rules	under	the	CAA	to	limit	emissions	of	certain	pollutants	from	cement	plants.	Circuit	 Judge	Kavanaugh	held	 that	EPA’s	 interpretation	of	 the	CAA’s	 “other	 requirements	preserved”	 provision	 and	 its	 decision	 to	 allow	 consideration	 of	 cost-effectiveness	 as	 a	component	 of	 the	 cost	 analysis	 for	 emissions	 standards	was	 reasonable;	 but	 the	 Agency	exceed	its	authority	in	adopting	affirmative	defense	to	private	civil	suits	under	the	CAA.		The	court	granted	the	petitions	for	review	with	regard	to	EPA’s	affirmative	defense,	and	it	vacated	 those	 portions	 of	 the	 2013	 Rule	 pertaining	 to	 the	 defense,	 but	 it	 denied	 the	petitions	in	all	other	respects.		
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American	Road	&	Transportation	Builders	Asso.	v.	EPA,	705	F.3d	453	(2013,	rehearing	en	banc	denied	April	30,	2013)	This	trade	organization	petitioned	for	review	of	an	order	of	EPA	to	amend	two	regulations	implementing	section	209	of	the	CAA	prohibiting	states	from	imposing	certain	emissions-related	 regulations	 on	 nonroad	 engines	 and	 vehicles.	 ARTBA	 began	 bringing	 those	challenges	 several	 years	 after	 the	 regulations	 relating	 to	 nonroad	 engines	 and	 vehicles	were	promulgated.	However,	the	petition	for	review	was	dismissed	because	venue	was	not	proper	 in	 the	 Court	 of	 Appeals	 for	 the	 District	 of	 Columbia	 on	 claim	 challenging	 EPA’s	approval	of	California’s	state	implementation	plan	(SIP),	and,	 in	addition,	the	challenge	to	EPA’s	regulations	was	time-barred.		
Honeywell	International,	Inc.	v.	EPA,	705	F.3d	470	(2013)	EPA	administers	a	 cap-and-trade	program	regulating	 the	production	and	consumption	of	hydrochlorofluorocarbons.	 It	 incorporated	 competitors	 prior	 hydrochlorofluorocarbon	(HCFC)	transfers	into	subsequent	baseline	allowances	which	reduced	other	manufacturers’	HCFC	 market	 share	 and	 allowances	 under	 cap-and-trade	 program.	 The	 manufacturers	petitioned	for	judicial	review.	Because	there	is	an	overall	cap	on	HCFC–22	production,	this	is	 a	 zero-sum	 system:	 The	 increased	 allowances	 to	 Arkema	 and	 Solvay	 in	 turn	 reduced	Honeywell’s	market	share	and	allowances	of	HCFC–22.	However,	the	Court	in	Arkema,	Inc.	
v.	EPA	concluded	that	those	permanent	transfers	were	valid	under	the	Clean	Air	Act.	Absent	en	 banc	 review,	 this	 decision	 is	 circuit	 precedent.	 And	 because	 Honeywell’s	 other	challenges	to	the	2008	transfers	are	meritless,	the	court	denied	the	petitions	for	review.		
EME	Homer	 City	 Generation,	 L.P.	 v.	 EPA,	 696	 F.3d	 7	 (D.C.	 Cir.	 2012,	 rehearing	 en	 banc	denied	Jan.	24,	2013).		This	case	involves	the	“good	neighbor”	provision	of	the	CAA	that	requires	states	to	prevent	sources	within	 their	 borders	 from	 emitting	 federally	 determined	 “amounts”	 of	 pollution	that	 travel	 across	 State	 lines	 and	 “contribute	 significantly”	 to	 a	 downwind	 State’s	“nonattainment”	 of	 federal	 air	 quality	 standards.	 In	 August	 2011,	 to	 implement	 the	statutory	good	neighbor	requirement,	EPA	promulgated	 the	rule	at	 issue	 in	 this	case,	 the	Transport	Rule,	also	known	as	the	Cross–State	Air	Pollution	Rule	(CSAPR).	The	Transport	Rule	 defines	 emissions	 reduction	 responsibilities	 for	 28	 upwind	 States	 based	 on	 those	States’	contributions	to	downwind	States’	air	quality	problems.	The	Rule	 limits	emissions	from	upwind	 States’	 coal-	 and	 natural	 gas-fired	 power	 plants,	 among	 other	 sources.	 The	Transport	 Rule	 targets	 two	 of	 those	 pollutants,	 sulfur	 dioxide	 (SO2)	 and	 nitrogen	 oxides	(NOx).		Circuit	 Judge	Kavanaugh	held	 that	 EPA	 exceeded	 its	 statutory	 authority	 under	 the	 “good	neighbor”	 provision	 of	 the	 Clean	 Air	 Act	 in	 implementing	 the	 Transport	 Rule,	 and	 EPA	could	 not	 issue	 Federal	 Implementation	 Plans	 (FIPs)	 without	 giving	 States	 an	 initial	opportunity	 to	 implement	 the	 required	 emissions	 reductions	 through	 State	Implementation	 Plans	 (SIPs)	 or	 through	 SIP	 revisions.	 The	 CSAPR	 was	 vacated	 and	remanded.		
American	Trucking	Ass’ns,	Inc.	v.	EPA,	600	F.3d	624	(2010)	
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The	petitioners	 representing	 the	United	States	 trucking	 industry	petitioned	 for	 review	of	EPA’s	 decision	 to	 authorize	 California’s	 rule	 limiting	 emissions	 from	 in-use	 non-road	engines,	particularly	 transportation	 refrigeration	units	 (TRU)	powered	by	diesel	 engines.	Congress	 has	 given	 California	 the	 primary	 role	 in	 regulating	 emissions	 from	 in-use	 non-road	engines.	EPA	must	approve	a	proposed	California	regulation	unless:	(1)	EPA	finds	that	California	unreasonably	determined	 that	 its	 rule	 is	 at	 least	 as	protective	of	public	health	and	welfare	as	the	relevant	 federal	standards;	(2)	EPA	concludes	that	California	does	not	need	 the	 proposed	 standard	 “to	 meet	 compelling	 and	 extraordinary	 conditions”	 in	California;	or	(3)	EPA	finds	that	California’s	standards	“are	not	consistent	with”	the	CAA’s	requirements	that	requires	EPA	to	assess	whether	the	California	rule	prevents	other	states	from	deciding	to	“adopt	and	enforce”	the	California	rule.		Circuit	Judge	Kavanaugh	held	that	EPA’s	conclusion	that	California’s	rule	was	needed	was	not	arbitrary	and	capricious;	the	rule	did	not	impose	a	de	facto	national	rule	that	precluded	other	states	from	declining	to	follow	it;	and	EPA	adequately	considered	cost	of	compliance.	The	petition	was	denied.	
	
Concurring	opinions		
Utility	Air	Regulatory	Group	v.	EPA,	744	F.3d	741	(2014)	This	case	involved	petitions	by	a	State	and	industry	group	challenging	final	rules	issued	by	EPA	regulating	particulate	matter	 from	fossil-fuel-fired	steam	generating	units.	The	 focus	of	the	petitioners	was	on	the	rule’s	requirements	for	monitoring	and	measuring	emissions	Chief	 Judge	 Garland,	writing	 for	 the	majority,	 upheld	 the	 rules	 by	 finding	 they	were	 not	arbitrary	 and	 capricious.	 Circuit	 Judge	 Kavanaugh	 concurred	 with	 the	 decision,	 and	 his	opinion	merely	made	the	observation	that	the	exhaustion/finality	rule	used	by	the	majority	should	not	be	considered	jurisdictional.		
Center	for	Biological	Diversity	v.	EPA,	722	F.3d	401	(2013)	
 In	 this	 case,	 environmental	 groups	 petitioned	 for	 review	 of	 EPA’s	 administrative	 action,	which	 deferred	 regulation	 of	 “biogenic”	 carbon	 dioxide,	 which	 includes	 ethanol,	 for	 a	period	 of	 three	 years.	 In	 support	 of	 this	 so-called	 Deferral	 Rule,	 EPA’s	 Deferral	 Rule	exempts	from	regulation	biogenic	carbon	dioxide	sources	that	trigger	the	PSD	and	Title	V	permitting	 programs	 at	 Step	 Two	 of	 the	 Tailoring	 Rule.	 The	 rule	 accomplishes	 this	 by	amending	 the	 regulatory	 definition	 of	 “greenhouse	 gases”	 to	 exclude	 biogenic	 carbon	dioxide.	The	so-called	“anyway”	sources	that	obtained	PSD	and	Title	V	permits	during	Step	One	of	the	Tailoring	Rule,	however,	must	still	install	BACT	for	their	biogenic	carbon	dioxide	emissions.	 The	 Deferral	 Rule	 has	 a	 three-year	 sunset	 provision	 whereas	 the	 de	 minimis	doctrine	“is	used	to	establish	permanent	exemptions.”	 	Given	this	concession,	the	Deferral	Rule	cannot	be	sustained	under	the	de	minimis	doctrine.	The	one-step-at-a-time	doctrine,	which	 EPA	 does	 defend,	 authorizes	 agencies	 to	 promulgate	 regulations	 in	 a	 piecemeal	fashion.	 However,	 EPA’s	 invocation	 of	 the	 one-step-at-a-time	 doctrine	was	 arbitrary	 and	capricious.	Therefore,	the	administrative	action	was	vacated.		Circuit	Judge	Kavanaugh	in	his	concurring	opinion	stated	there	is	zero	basis	in	the	text	of	the	 Clean	 Air	 Act	 for	 EPA	 to	 distinguish	 biogenic	 carbon	 dioxide	 from	 other	 sources	 of	
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carbon	 dioxide	 that	 EPA	 is	 required	 to	 regulate	 for	 purposes	 of	 the	 PSD	 and	 Title	 V	permitting	 programs.	 statute	 does	 not	 give	 EPA	 the	 authority	 to	 distinguish	 a	 stationary	source’s	 emissions	 of	 biogenic	 carbon	 dioxide	 from	 emissions	 of	 other	 forms	 of	 carbon	dioxide	for	purposes	of	these	permitting	programs.	He	stated	“I	have	mixed	feelings	about	this	case.	That’s	because	I	believe,	contrary	to	this	Circuit’s	precedent,	that	the	PSD	statute	does	not	cover	carbon	dioxide,	whether	biogenic	or	not.”	However,	he	believes	the	court	is	bound	 to	 apply	 the	 precedent	 that	 requires	 EPA	 is	 required	 to	 regulate	 carbon	 dioxide	under	the	PSD	and	Title	V	permitting	programs.	There	is	no	statutory	basis	for	exempting	biogenic	carbon	dioxide.			
Dissenting	opinions			
Mexichem	Speciality	Resins,		Inc.	v.	EPA,	787	F.3d	544	(2015)	Manufacturers	of	polyvinyl	chloride	challenged	EPA’s	rule	limiting	emissions	of	hazardous	air	 pollutants.	 The	 court	 upheld	 EPA’s	 rule	 including	 its	 rule	 requiring	 all	 releases	 of	pollutants	by	pressure	relief	devices	to	meet	the	rule’s	process	vent	emissions	limits.	The	rule	was	held	not	to	be	arbitrary	and	capricious,	and	the	petition	was	denied.		Circuit	Judge	Kavenaugh	dissented	in	part.	EPA’s	PCV	rule	imposed	limits	on	emissions	of	hazardous	air	pollutants.	But	EPA	later	concluded	that	one	category	of	those	limits—the	so-called	 wastewater	 limits	 on	 hazardous	 air	 pollutants	 that	 may	 be	 dissolved	 in	wastewater—was	 based	 on	 bad	 data.	 EPA	 therefore	 said	 it	 was	 reconsidering	 the	wastewater	limits,	and	it	would	complete	the	reconsideration	process	in	2016.			Petitioners,	 contended	 that	 EPA’s	 flawed	 wastewater	 limits	 should	 be	 stayed	 under	 the	Administrative	 Procedure	 Act	 provision	 authorizing	 stays	 pending	 judicial	 review.	 Judge	Kavanaugh	 believes	 the	 petitioners	 are	 correct.	 They	 have	 demonstrated	 a	 likelihood	 of	success	on	the	merits;	they	have	shown	irreparable	harm;	and	they	have	precedent	on	their	side.	EPA	did	not	oppose	a	stay	in	this	case.	Given	the	circumstances,	as	well	as	precedent,	Judge	Kavanaugh	supported	a	stay	of	the	wastewater	limits	pending	judicial	review,	and	he	dissented	from	the	majority	opinion’s	decision	not	to	stay	EPA’s	wastewater	limits.			
White	Stallion	Energy	Center,	LLC	v.	EPA,	748	F.3d	1222	(D.C.	Cir.	2014)	This	 case	 involves	 state,	 industry,	 labor	 and	 environmental	 entities	 that	 petitioned	 for	review	of	EPA’s	final	rule	regulating	hazardous	air	pollutants	(HAPs)	emitted	from	electric	utility	steam	generating	units	(EGUs).	The	majority	opinion	held	that	EPA	reasonably	relied	upon	 CAA	 criteria	 for	 delisting	 pollutants	 in	 determining	 necessity	 of	 regulating	 EGU	emissions;	 EPA	 reasonably	 concluded	 that	 it	 was	 not	 required	 to	 consider	 costs	 in	determining	whether	 to	 regulation	EGU	emissions;	and	EPA	reasonably	concluded	 that	 it	could	regulate	all	HAP	emissions	from	EGUs.	The	court	also	determined	that	EPA	findings	on	health	effects	of	mercury	exposure	supported	regulating	these	EGU	emissions,	and	EPA	reasonably	relied	upon	chromium	emissions	data	in	assessing	risks	from	non-mercury	EGU	emissions.	The	petition	was	denied.		
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Circuit	Judge	Kavanaugh	filed	an	opinion	concurring	in	part	and	dissenting	in	part.	Under	the	CAA’s	§	112(n)	coal-	and	oil-fired	electric	utility	steam	generating	units	are	held	 to	a	different	 standard	 for	 hazardous	 air	 pollution	 emissions	 with	 EPA	 being	 charged	 with	making	 “appropriate	 and	 necessary”	 regulations.	 The	 statute	 is	 not	 clear	 concerning	whether	 costs	must	 be	 considered.	 	 EPA	 did	 not	 consider	 costs,	 which	 are	 huge.	 Circuit	Judge	 Kavanaugh	 disagreed	 with	 the	 majority	 that	 upheld	 EPA’s	 exclusion	 of	 costs	 He	believes	 that	 “appropriate”	 mandates	 the	 consideration	 of	 costs.	 He	 also	 believes	 that	competitors	of	regulated	companies	should	be	considered	to	be	within	the	zone	of	interests	needed	to	have	standing	under	the	Administrative	Procedure	Act.		
Texas	v.	EPA,	726	F.3d	180	(2013) The	States	of	Texas	and	Wyoming	and	 industry	groups	petitioned	 for	 review	of	 five	EPA	rules	designed	to	ensure	that	permitting	authority	existed	to	issue	greenhouse	gas	permits	under	 the	 CAA.	 	 Circuit	 Judge	 Rogers	 held	 that	 the	 states	 and	 industry	 groups	 failed	 to	establish	 the	 challenged	 rules	 caused	 them	 injury	 in	 fact,	 as	 required	 to	 establish	standing.	Thus,	the	petitions	were	dismissed.		Circuit	 Judge	 Kavanaugh	 dissented.	 EPA’s	 GHG	 emissions	 regulations	 require	 states	 to	revise	 the	 portions	 of	 their	 SIPs	 incorporating	 the	 PSD	 program,	 which	 requires	construction	permits	for	large	construction	projects.	EPA	set	deadlines	for	states	to	update	their	SIPs,	which	Texas	and	Wyoming	did	not	meet.	EPA	then	imposed	FIPs,	for	Texas	and	Wyoming.	 	 Petitioners	 challenged	 EPA’s	 action.	 Judge	 Kavanaugh	 looked	 at	 the	 relevant	EPA	 regulations,	 which	 gives	 States	 three	 years	 to	 revise	 their	 SIPs	 whenever	 new	pollutants,	 like	 greenhouse	 gases	were	 regulated	 under	 EPA’s	 PSD	 regulations.	 EPA	 also	relied	on	an	alternative	ground	in	imposing	a	FIP	on	Texas.	EPA	retroactively	disapproved	Texas’s	pre-existing	SIP	because,	according	to	EPA,	the	SIP	was	flawed	when	EPA	approved	it	 18	 years	 earlier.	 But	 neither	 the	 Act	 nor	 EPA	 regulations	 require	 either	 an	 automatic	updating	SIP	or	assurances	 that	 the	state	will	update	 its	plan.	Therefore,	Texas’s	SIP	was	not	 flawed	 when	 EPA	 approved	 it	 18	 years	 earlier,	 and	 it	 cannot	 be	 retroactively	disapproved	on	that	basis.	He	would	vacate	the	relevant	EPA	orders.		
Grocery	Mfrs.	Ass’n	v.	EPA,	693	F.3d	169	(2012)	Trade	 associations	 comprised	 of	 engine	 manufacturers,	 petroleum	 suppliers,	 and	 food	producers	petitioned	 for	 review	of	EPA’s	 final	actions	 that	granted	partial	waivers	under	the	 CAA	 approving	 introduction	 into	 commerce	 of	 E15,	which	 is	 a	 blend	 of	 gasoline	 and	15%	ethanol,	for	use	in	select	motor	vehicles	and	engines.	Chief	Judge	Sentelle	held	that	the	various	petitioners	lacked	standing,	and	the	petition	was	denied.		Circuit	Judge	Kavenaugh	dissented.	In	order	to	issue	the	waiver	under	the	statute,	EPA	had	to	find	that	E15	would	not	cause	any	car	models	made	after	1974	to	fail	to	meet	emissions	standards.	EPA	found	that	E15	could	cause	emissions	failures	in	some	cars	made	after	1974	(namely,	 in	 cars	 made	 between	 1975	 and	 2000).	 Nonetheless,	 for	 the	 first	 time,	 EPA	granted	what	it	termed	a	“partial	waiver,”	meaning	that	the	waiver	allowed	E15	use	only	in	cars	made	after	2000.				Two	important	American	industries	could	be	negatively	affected	by	EPA’s	allegedly	illegal	
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E15	 waiver,	 but	 the	 majority	 opinion	 rejected	 the	 petition	 based	 on	 a	 lack	 of	 standing.	Judge	Tatel	and	Judge	Kavanaugh	agree	that	the	food	group	had	standing.	But	the	majority	opinion	 found	 that	 the	 food	 group	 was	 not	 an	 aggrieved	 party	 (that	 is,	 it	 did	 not	 have	prudential	 standing)	 for	purposes	of	 the	Administrative	Procedure	Act.	And	 the	majority	opinion	 concluded	 that	 the	 petroleum	 group’s	 injury	 is	 not	 caused	 by	 EPA’s	 E15	waiver	decision,	 therefore	 it	 does	 not	 have	 Article	 III	 standing.	 Judge	 Kavanaugh	 believes	 both	groups	had	standing,	and	he	provided	a	detailed	brief	on	the	law	of	standing.	However,	on	the	merits	he	concludes	that	in	order	to	issue	the	waiver	under	the	statute,	EPA	had	to	find	that	 E15	 would	 not	 cause	 any	 car	 models	 made	 after	 1974	 to	 fail	 to	 meet	 emissions	standards.	EPA	found	that	E15	could	cause	emissions	failures	in	some	cars	made	after	1974	(namely,	 in	cars	made	between	1975	and	2000).	Nonetheless,	EPA	still	granted	a	“partial	waiver,”	 meaning	 that	 the	 waiver	 allowed	 E15	 use	 only	 in	 cars	 made	 after	 2000.	 Judge	Kavanaugh	believes	that	“In	granting	the	E15	partial	waiver,	EPA	ran	roughshod	over	the	relevant	 statutory	 limits.”	 He	 stated,	 “EPA’s	 disregard	 of	 the	 statutory	 text	 is	 open	 and	notorious—and	not	much	more	needs	to	be	said.”		
Sierra	Club	v.	EPA,	536	F.3d	673	(2008),	Environmental	 organization	 filed	 a	Petition	 for	Review	 concerning	EPA’s	 final	 order	 that	prevented	state	and	local	authorities	from	supplementing	federal	monitoring	requirements	under	 the	CAA.	Circuit	 Judge	Griffith	held	 that	 the	 rule	 contravened	a	 statutory	directive	that	 stationary-source	 emission	 permits	 include	 adequate	monitoring	 requirements,	 and	the	preexisting	monitoring	rules	were	consistent	with	statute.	The	petition	was	granted	in	part	and	denied	in	part.		Circuit	 Judge	Kavanaugh	dissented	claiming	 the	 relevant	 statutory	 language	supports	 the	rule.	 The	 CAA	 §	 504(c)	 grants	 EPA	 the	 authority	 to	 determine	 whether	 state	 and	 local	permitting	 authorities	 can	 impose	 additional	 monitoring	 requirements	 that	 “conform	 to	any	applicable	regulation	under	subsection	(b)	of	this	section.”	In	turn,	subsection	(b)	says	EPA	“may	by	rule	prescribe	procedures	and	methods	for	determining	compliance	and	for	
monitoring	 and	 analysis	 of	 pollutants	 regulated	 under	 this	 chapter....”	 	 	 EPA	 has	 decided	state	and	local	permitting	authorities	may	not	add	new	periodic	monitoring	requirements	when	 issuing	 permits.	 EPA	 determined	 that	 the	 permitting	 process	 is	 not	 the	 time	 and	place	 for	 state	 and	 local	 permitting	 authorities	 to	 add	 new	 periodic	 monitoring	requirements.	 Rather,	 if	 changes	 are	 to	 be	 made	 to	 the	 underlying	 monitoring	requirements,	they	should	occur	during	the	process	for	formulating	and	revising	SIP,	NSPS,	NESHAP,	 and	 other	 applicable	 requirements.	 Therefore,	 Judge	 Kavanaugh	 would	 reject	petitioners’	primary	statutory	argument	and	deny	the	petition	in	whole.	 	
Coalition	for	Responsible	Regulation	v.	EPA,	2012	WL	6621785	(Dec.	20,	2012)	A	central	question	in	this	case	was	how	to	construe	the	term	“air	pollutant”	for	purposes	of	a	 statutory	 permitting	 requirement.	 Does	 the	 term	 “air	 pollutant”	 cover	 not	 just	 the	 six	criteria	pollutants,	but	also	greenhouse	gases	such	as	carbon	dioxide,	which	contribute	to	global	 warming?	 Under	 the	 broader	 interpretation	 of	 “air	 pollutant”	 that	 encompasses	greenhouse	 gases,	 a	 far	 greater	 number	 of	 facilities	 would	 fall	 within	 the	 Prevention	 of	Significant	 Deterioration	 program	 and	 have	 to	 obtain	 pre-construction	 permits.	 That	 in	turn	 would	 impose	 significantly	 higher	 costs	 on	 businesses	 and	 individuals	 that	 are	
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building	new	commercial	or	residential	property.	Judge	Kavanaugh	believed	EPA	exceeded	its	statutory	authority,	and	he	disagreed	with	the	panel	opinion’s	contrary	conclusion.		He	believes	Massachusetts	v.	EPA,	549	U.S.	497	(2007),	is	not	controlling	and	the	text	and	context	 of	 the	Prevention	 of	 Significant	Deterioration	program	as	 a	whole,	 demonstrates	the	term	“air	pollutant”	refers	to	the	six	criteria	(NAAQS)	air	pollutants.	EPA	has	long	held	the	PSD	program	regulates	all	pollutants	regulated	by	the	CAA	and	not	just	the	six	criteria	pollutants.	This	creates	problems	because	the	threshold	for	PSD	applicability,	if	applied	to	GHGs	would	trigger	a	dramatically	higher	number	of	facilities	that	would	be	subject	to	the	need	for	pre-construction	permits.	For	this	reason,	EPA	re-wrote	the	very	specific	250–ton	trigger	in	the	permitting	requirement	of	the	statute	in	its	Tailoring	Rule	to	raise	the	trigger	for	GHG	emissions	 from	250	tons	 to	100,000	tons.	 Judge	Kavanaugh	held	 that	 this	rule	 if	upheld	would	allow	agencies	to	adopt	absurd	or	otherwise	unreasonable	interpretations	of	statutory	 provisions	 and	 then	 edit	 other	 statutory	 provisions	 to	 mitigate	 the	unreasonableness.	Allowing	agencies	to	exercise	that	kind	of	statutory	re-writing	authority	could	significantly	enhance	the	Executive	Branch’s	power	at	the	expense	of	Congress’s	and	thereby	alter	the	relative	balance	of	powers	in	the	administrative	process.	
 
 He	makes	a	compelling	argument	that	the	PSD	program	is	limited	to	NAAQS	pollutants,	but	once	 a	 facility	 is	 subject	 to	 PSD	 section	 7475(a)(4)	 imposes	 requirements	 on	 other	pollutants	 regulated	 by	 the	 Act,	 including	 GHGs,	 that	 include	 the	 need	 to	meet	 BACT.	 In	
Massachusetts	v.	EPA,	the	Supreme	Court	explicitly	relied	on	the	fact	that	the	Clean	Air	Act’s	definition	 of	 ‘air	 pollutant’	 “did	 not	 produce	 “extreme”	 consequences	 in	 the	 context	 of	motor	 vehicle	 emissions.	 But,	 when	 applied	 to	 the	 PSD	 program	 EPA’s	 definition	 of	 air	pollutant	produces	extreme	consequences.	He	concludes	EPA	chose	an	admittedly	absurd	reading	over	a	perfectly	natural	reading	of	the	relevant	statutory	text.	An	agency	cannot	do	that.			
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